Most recent edit on 2008-02-05 01:50:20 by MichaelRogers [Added information about n-cliques etc]
Additions:
Clusters in the network would be a natural basis for cells. There are various∞ ways∞ to define clusters. For example:
1) n-cliques: every member can reach every other member in n hops.
2) n-clans: every member can reach every other member in n hops, all of which are also members.
3) k-plexes: each of the n members is connected to at least n-k others (a fully connected subgraph is a 1-plex).
However we define cells, a node must be able to work out which cell(s) it belongs to using only its local view of the network. It's not clear how to do this with the definitions above. In the k-plex case, what if the cell is larger than the node's local view? In the n-clique case, if a node can reach two other nodes in n hops but they aren't within n hops of each other, which does it eliminate from its cell?
Edited on 2007-09-11 15:04:18 by MatthewToseland [links]
Additions:
Note that the above is for darknet. It's likely that we will need a completely different mechanism more like what I2P or Tor does for peer selection on opennet.
Deletions:
Note that the above is for darknet. It's likely that we will need a completely different mechanism more like what I2P or Tor does for peer selection on opennet.
Edited on 2007-09-11 15:04:01 by MatthewToseland [mention opennet]
Additions:
Note that the above is for darknet. It's likely that we will need a completely different mechanism more like what I2P or Tor does for peer selection on opennet.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:31:00 by MatthewToseland [rearrange a bit more]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random nodes from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. We cannot just choose a node and then a node connected to it, because if the first node is evil, the second node may be fake. Choosing two nodes at random from the cell prevents predecessor-probability attacks; to prevent fraction-of-a-splitfile attacks and node downtime attacks, we need the cellular structure. To prevent Sybil attacks (node pretending to be many nodes) we need a trust metric: see this blog post∞, a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. Choosing two nodes prevents predecessor-probability attacks; to prevent fraction-of-a-splitfile attacks and node downtime attacks, we need the cellular structure. To prevent Sybil attacks (node pretending to be many nodes) we need a trust metric: see this blog post∞, a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Note that we cannot just choose a node and then a node connected to it, because if the first node is evil, the second node may be fake.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:27:47 by MatthewToseland [rewrite a bit]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. Choosing two nodes prevents predecessor-probability attacks; to prevent fraction-of-a-splitfile attacks and node downtime attacks, we need the cellular structure. To prevent Sybil attacks (node pretending to be many nodes) we need a trust metric: see this blog post∞, a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Note that we cannot just choose a node and then a node connected to it, because if the first node is evil, the second node may be fake.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see this blog post∞, a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:23:51 by MatthewToseland [add blog post]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see this blog post∞, a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:13:33 by MatthewToseland [trust metrics]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, trust metrics∞ etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:12:55 by MatthewToseland [add the recent idea]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, etc; hopefully just starting with 1.0 and splitting it on each node as we go outwards would be a useful metric.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, etc.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:12:04 by MatthewToseland [formatting fix?]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see a mailing list post∞, TrustRank∞, etc.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see , , etc.
Edited on 2007-08-17 17:11:16 by MatthewToseland [some links]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it. One solution to this is to propagate trust outwards: see , , etc.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.
Edited on 2007-05-17 19:08:46 by MatthewToseland [fix link]
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.
Edited on 2007-03-01 21:52:06 by TanGram [Link to PreTunneling added]
Additions:
An alternative proposal is PreTunneling.
Edited on 2006-04-27 14:05:36 by MatthewToseland
Additions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.
Deletions:
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.
Oldest known version of this page was edited on 2006-04-27 14:05:07 by MatthewToseland []
Page view:
Premix routing
A layer of "onion routing" at the beginning of a request, to protect against
correlation attacks.
This will be difficult; the best option is probably to divide the darknet into
cells, groups of say 50 nodes within which the topology is published, and choose 2 random peers from within the cell (with each node in the cell equally likely to be picked), to tunnel through. Then your anonymity set is the cell. The biggest problem here is that a node may pretend to be many nodes; this is what prevents us from simply exposing the topology for a few hops and picking a random node, then a random node connected to it.